General Principles of EU Law and EU Administrative Law by Hofmann, Herwig
8




2  Organizational levels and the distribution of powers in  
implementing EU law  199




Treaty provisions and Union legislation are only part of the story of how law can actually 
take effect in reality. A quite decisive factor is their implementation through administra-
tive action. The basic themes of this chapter are, first, the steps which take place after 
legislation has been passed: who does what and by which means to make sure that politi-
cal decisions made in a legislative act do not only remain ‘law on the books’? The second 
theme is which rights exist in that context? How can they be protected? In other words, 
this chapter deals not only with the sub- legislative setting of rules and making of decisions, 
it also asks which principles and rules exist to ensure the legality and legitimacy of admin-
istrative action implementing EU law. Such principles of EU law are, of course, often rel-
evant as criteria of legality of all forms of EU law. Where they are of special relevance to the 
matter discussed in this chapter they are addressed here. You will find them also discussed 
in other specific contexts, for example in chapters on legislation or on judicial review.
The legal issues addressed in this chapter influence questions as varied as one can imag-
ine: will a medicine which one study finds to do more harm to a patient than good in com-
bating the relevant disease be taken off the market in the entire EU? How much minimum 
capital should a bank maintain in order to be allowed to offer services? May a product 
labelled as ‘organic’ contain traces of genetically modified organisms? What level of train-
ing should the pilot of a commercial airliner maintain to be allowed to fly over and land 
at an airport in the EU? Can the bank account held by a citizen of the Union be frozen by 
order of the United Nations Security Council? Can I ask the administration in my home 
country to grant me access to the information that has been collected about me in another 
Member State of the Union? Is the permission to build an offshore wind- energy park legal 
when no previous study has been made to assess whether the flight patterns of migrating 
birds might thereby be disturbed?
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Finding solutions to these questions will regularly require having a basic understand-
ing of what are referred to in this chapter as general principles of EU law and of EU 
administrative law. Administrative law is part of public law enabling and constraining 
administrative conduct, that is, activity designed to implement EU law. The essence of 
EU administrative law is therefore the rules and principles governing the procedures for 
exercising administrative functions and the organization of the institutions and bodies 
exercising these functions. One word of caution, though, is necessary: the EU’s legal order 
is particularly dynamic. This is due to the evolving nature of European Union integration 
and growing interdependencies between various levels of law and politics. The effect is 
that a combination of legal sources— international, EU, and national— are being used in 
most policy areas, adapting the needs of the policy area to the possibilities of a Union with 
limited conferral of powers, and often varying constellations of Member States taking part 
in specific policies.
In order to explain this area using a step- by- step approach, this chapter will give an 
overview of the key institutions and agencies of the EU and what they do (section 2). Then, 
it will move on to develop an understanding of the applicable law which is key to develop-
ing notions of accountability and the protection of rights in this field (section 3).
You are already familiar with some elements relevant in this chapter. You have, for 
example, read in  chapter 5 (on decision- making and competences) about delegated and 
implementing acts under Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, and that the EU possesses only those 
powers conferred on it. In other contexts, you will have read about the separation of func-
tions between the Member States and the EU— especially the principle of sincere coopera-
tion between Member States and the Union. You will further have read about EU agencies 
(as regards some particular EU agencies, see  chapters 25 and 26) and about the possibili-
ties of delegation of powers to agencies. In view of the central themes of this chapter, these 
elements are brought together in this chapter to show how institutional, substantive, and 
procedural law resulting from rules and principles of EU law shape the legal reality.
2  Organizational levels and the distribution of powers 
in implementing EU law
In the EU’s legal system, the exercise of the administrative function is undertaken by a 
diverse range of actors both at the EU level as well as at the Member State level. These are 
institutions and bodies of the Union as well as those of its Member States. The following 
discussion concentrates on some central principles of law governing this distribution and 
holding the actors on various levels to account.
2.1  Conferral of powers on the Union
Under the principle of conferral, not only is the Union barred from enacting legislation 
in cases where it is not authorized to do so by the Treaties, it is also barred from passing 
implementing acts if not authorized. This results from the principle of conferral under 
Article 5(1) and (2) TEU and is explicitly restated in Article 291(1) TFEU, under which 
‘Member States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary to implement legally 
binding Union acts.’
Only where the Union is authorized to act, can it do so. When administrative func-
tions are undertaken on the EU level, their exercise is organizationally fragmented. It is 
spread across the Commission (to a certain degree also the Council) and, increasingly, 
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EU agencies. Comitology committees, made up of Member State experts, are designated 
to supervise and advise the Commission when undertaking implementing activity under 
Article 291 TFEU. These were already addressed and explained further in the context of 
 chapter 5 on decision- making procedures.
Generally, where administrative powers are conferred on EU- level bodies, they are autho-
rized to adopt acts with general content— so- called rule- making. Areas where Union bodies 
have also been conferred with powers to take single case decisions with binding force on indi-
viduals are increasingly frequent. Initially, it was the Commission which was given external 
decision- making powers in the area of competition law including antitrust under Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU, merger control, and the control of State aid given by the Member States (see 
further  chapters 17 and 18). More and more, EU agencies are also taking decisions address-
ing issues of EU- wide concern such as the granting of trademarks for the entire EU market, 
admitting chemical products as safe for use, and other such regulatory activity.
In most policy areas, however, even if legislation has been adopted by the EU and even 
if some common rules for the implementation of these rules have been adopted at the EU 
level, final decisions vis- à- vis individuals implementing EU policies are taken by Member 
State bodies. Examples of this approach are customs decisions. Despite the fact that cus-
toms law and tariffs are entirely governed by EU law, because the customs union and the 
common commercial (ie external trade) policy are ‘exclusive competences’ of the EU (see 
 chapter 5), it is national customs officials who take the final decisions and enforce them. 
This is sometimes referred to as indirect administration of EU law.
2.2  Implementation of EU law by the Member States
In the absence of EU law provisions to the contrary, Member States not only have the right 
to implement EU law through their administrative apparatus, they are actually obliged to 
do so (see further  chapter 6).
Member States, under the principle of ‘sincere cooperation’ in Article 4(3) TEU, are 
obliged to
take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations 
arising out of the treaties or resulting from acts of the institutions of the union.
They may do so by applying existing national legislation, but may also be obliged by EU 
law to pass specific national implementing legislation and to adopt associated adminis-
trative regulations in order to create the conditions necessary for implementation at the 
national level. Member States, under this model, enjoy only limited institutional or proce-
dural autonomy to implement EU law.1
The limitations on the Member States’ autonomy therefore arise from the fact that, in the 
fields of Union policy, Member States’ substantive and procedural administrative law is to be 
applied within the framework of EU law. This framework consists of three basic concepts:
First, Member States have the right to set their own standards for substantive and pro-
cedural law only in the absence of any explicit requirements in Union law. Therefore, inso-
far as Union law itself makes provision as regards procedures, criteria, or organizational 
requirements, national administrations are obliged to act in conformity with these.2
1 Originally formulated in Case 33/ 76 Rewe- Zentralfinanz EG v Landwirtschafts- Kammer für das Saarland 
[1976] ECR 1989, para 5.
2 National law might turn out to be inconsistent or even incompatible with EU provisions in the area. The 
EU’s conflicts rules applicable to such situations are the principle of primacy and the possibility of direct effect 
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Secondly, in the area of indirect administration, the legality of Member States’ rules and 
procedures will be measured by their compliance with general principles of EU law and 
the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights (see further  chapter 9).
Thirdly, the application of national procedural rules in the implementation of Union law 
must be exercised in strict compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.3
2.2.1  ‘Equivalence’ and ‘effectiveness’
Under the principle of equivalence, in the absence of applicable EU law, Member States must 
grant at least equivalent protection for violation of EU law to that available against violation of 
national law.4 Provisions used under national law may not be ‘less favourable than those gov-
erning similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence)’.5 A rule must therefore ‘be applied 
without distinction’, whether the infringement arises from Union law or national law.6
Where there is no equivalent national law, or where its application does not lead to the 
result of enforcing or protecting a right under EU law, the principle of equivalence will 
override the principle of effectiveness. National courts are obliged to set aside
any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice 
which might impair the effectiveness [of union law].7
Even in cases where there is no equivalent form of protection of rights under national 
law, Member States, under the principle of effectiveness, may not make the exercise of 
rights conferred by Union law (even only temporarily) ‘practically impossible or exces-
sively difficult.’8
The obligations under the principles of equivalence and effectiveness apply not only 
to national courts but also directly to national administrations.9 The latter are explicitly 
obliged under EU law to set aside national laws which are in conflict with directly effective 
EU law.10
2.2.2  Decision- making with ‘trans- territorial’ effect
In many cases, implementation of EU law by Member States requires the national bod-
ies to take decisions which have an effect not only on the territory of that State but in the 
of EU law. These interpretative principles oblige the Member States’ bodies to set aside national law which is in 
conflict with EU law provisions; see eg case law since Case 106/ 77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v 
Simmenthal SpA (‘Simmenthal II’) [1978] ECR 629 and the discussion in  chapter 6.
3 See Case C- 261/ 95 Palmisani v INPS [1997] ECR I- 4025, para 27. See also Case C- 453/ 99 Courage and 
Crehan [2001] ECR I- 6297, para 25.
4 Joined Cases C- 205– 215/ 82 Deutsche Milchkontor [1983] ECR 2633, para 17; Courage (n 3) para 29.
5 Courage (n 3) para 29.
6 Case C- 231/ 96 Edis [1998] ECR I- 4951, para 36; Joined Cases 66/ 79, 127/ 79 and 128/ 79 Salumi [1980] 
ECR 1237, para 21. Whether a situation under EU law is sufficiently similar to a situation regulated under 
national law is subject to detailed case- by- case analysis, the Court looking at the purpose and effect of a 
national measure in question— see Case C- 326/ 96 Levez [1998] ECR I- 7835, para 41.
7 Case C- 213/ 89 Factortame [1990] ECR I- 2433, paras 19 and 20.
8 Courage (n 3) para 29. This is a standard formula which can be found in many cases, eg Case C- 128/ 93 
Fisscher [1994] ECR I- 4583, para 37; Joined Cases C- 231– 233/ 06 Jonkman [2007] ECR I- 5149, para 28.
9 S Prechal, Directives in EC Law (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 65– 72.
10 See Case 103/ 88 Fratelli Costanzo v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839; Case C- 224/ 97 Ciola [1999] 
ECR I- 2517; Case C- 118/ 00 Larsy v Inasti [2001] ECR I- 5063; Case C- 453/ 00 Kühne & Heitz [2004] ECR I- 837. 
These cases, for the basis of that obligation, refer to the principle of sincere cooperation under Art 4(3) TEU 
(but the cases still refer to the old Art 10 EC). For a critique of this approach by the Court of Justice, see eg 
Prechal, Directives in EC Law (n 9) 65– 72.
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entire EU. This phenomenon can be well illustrated by looking at EU customs law. Once a 
toy from China has been imported into the EU, for example via a port in the Netherlands 
(eg Rotterdam), the toy can be sold throughout the Union without facing any further 
customs duties or controls; in other words, it can freely circulate in the Union. The Dutch 
customs officials classifying the product as a toy and assessing the customs tariff due to be 
paid, in that sense act as customs officials of the entire Union. They act on a mix of appli-
cable law— they are agents of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and subject to the rules and 
procedures of their own hierarchic system— yet in the exercise of their duties as customs 
officials and in the classification of the goods, they act on the basis of EU law.
In order to mitigate this very common phenomenon of what might be referred to as 
decision- making with trans- territorial effect (some authors say trans- national effect), in 
most policy areas there is some form of common structure for the exchange of informa-
tion and coordination of administrative action. These are sometimes referred to using the 
metaphor ‘networks’. The objective of such structures of information exchange, which are 
established by EU legislation or international agreement between Member States, is to 
reduce potential problems arising from decentralized administration of a common legal 
space. An example of such a system is the so- called ‘Schengen Information System’,11 basi-
cally a very large database on persons wanted by law- enforcement agencies who are to be 
denied entry to the Schengen zone, and stolen objects (see further  chapters 25 and 26). 
Other such information networks exist, to name just a few examples, on food safety,12 
the environment,13 external borders, fisheries,14 maritime and ship safety,15 customs, and 
value added tax.16 These information exchanges are generally managed and maintained by 
EU agencies.
2.3  Delegation of powers within the Union
As discussed in  chapter  3, delegation of powers from legislators to executive (in prac-
tice, administrative) bodies constitutes an inevitable aspect of modern legal systems. 
Reasons include the technical complexity of many areas of regulation, the limited effec-
tiveness of hierarchical command structures, and the highly pluralistic societies which 
require knowledge and balancing of very diverse interests. At first glance, the principle of 
11 Council Decision 2007/ 533/ JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the second 
generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) (OJ [2007] L205/ 63); Regulation (EC) No 1987/ 2006 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the establishment, operation and use of the 
second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) (OJ [2006] L381/ 4).
12 Regulation (EC) No 178/ 2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying 
down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority 
and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ [2002] L31/ 1); Commission Regulation (EU) No 16/ 
2001 of 10 January 2011 laying down implementing measures for the rapid alert system for food and feed (OJ 
[2011] L6/ 7).
13 Regulation (EC) No 401/ 2009 of the European Parliament and of the council of 23 April 2009 on the 
European Environment Agency and the European Environment Information and Observation Network (OJ 
[2009] L126/ 13).
14 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/ 2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system to pre-
vent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, amending Regulation (EEC) No 2847/ 
93, (EC) No 1936/ 2001 and (EC) No 601/ 2004 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1093/ 94 and (EC) No 1447/ 
1999 (OJ [2008] L286/ 1).
15 Regulation (EC) No 1406/ 2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2002 establish-
ing a European Maritime Safety Agency (OJ [2002] L208/ 1).
16 See more generally on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation, Council Directive 2011/ 16/ EU 
of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/ 779/ EC 
(OJ [2011] L64/ 1).
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attributed powers under Articles 5(2) and 13(2) TEU provides a presumption against del-
egation. Under these provisions, powers should be exercised in the EU by those entrusted 
with them by the Treaties. However, delegation is not only a practical necessity but also a 
general phenomenon in the implementation of EU policies.
The Treaty provisions on delegation of powers, set out in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, 
favour delegation to the Commission (see further  chapter 5).17 In this system, no reference 
is made to agencies as possible recipients of delegations— despite the express acknowledge-
ment in the provisions on judicial review of acts (Article 263, paragraphs 1 and 5, TFEU) of 
EU agencies as potential decision- makers (see further  chapter 10).18 In the same vein, the 
2011 Comitology Regulation (ie the general rules on the conferment upon the Commission 
of the power to adopt measures implementing EU acts, pursuant to Article 291 TFEU)19 
makes no mention of agencies and does not clarify the relation of decision- making with 
the help of comitology committees as opposed to agency decision- making.20 Instead, it 
establishes for this delegation to the Commission two decision- making procedures only— 
the advisory and the examination procedures. Yet, whilst some agencies have a legal basis 
directly in the Treaties,21 most are created by legislative act. EU agencies have been entrusted 
with pursuing different tasks,22 ranging from the provision of information, the provision of 
services as a basis for the adoption of implementing acts, and even the exercise of specific 
implementing powers.23 Even though some agencies support the Commission only by col-
lecting information or processing applications, other agencies have delegated powers to 
adopt individually binding decision- making, such as the Community Plant Variety Office 
(CPVO), the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), and, in non- scientific fields, the Office 
of Harmonization for the Internal Market (OHIM). In these cases, agencies exert limited 
discretion, well qualified by the provisions of the relevant regulations.24
17 Art 290 TFEU allows conferring upon the Commission the power to adopt quasi- legislative ‘delegated’ 
acts under the oversight of the European Parliament and the Council. Under Art 291, paras 2 and 3, TFEU, 
implementing powers shall be conferred on the Commission— exceptionally on the Council— ‘where uniform 
conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed’.
18 Besides Art 263 TFEU, several other provisions in the TFEU directly take into consideration the importance 
and role played by agencies in the EU legal system. Among these, the most important are: Art 15 (transparency 
and access to documents), Art 16 (data protection), Art 228 (competence of the European Ombudsman), Art 265 
(action for failure to act), Art 267 (reference for preliminary ruling), and Art 287 (jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Auditors). Also the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights under Art 47 explicitly gives the right to an effec-
tive remedy, including against agencies. Agencies are further explicitly mentioned in Arts 41, 42, and 43 Charter.
19 Regulation (EU) No 182/ 2011 of 16 February 2011, laying down the rules and general principles con-
cerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ 
[2011] L55/ 13), is the legislative act that under Art 291, para 3, TFEU lays down ‘mechanisms for control by 
Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers’.
20 Instead it might actually be read to exclude the possibilities of delegating decision- making powers to 
independent EU agencies since it allows explicitly only for either the advisory or the examination procedure. 
Regulation 182/ 2011 (OJ [2011] L55/ 13).
21 eg the European Police Office, Europol, Art 88 TFEU; the agency in charge of cooperation of judicial 
cooperation, Eurojust, Art 85 TFEU. On these bodies, see further  chapter 25.
22 The basis for this classification can be found in E Vos, ‘Reforming the European Commission:  What 
Role to Play for EU Agencies’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 1113 at 1120– 1121. For a different clas-
sification of agencies, see E Chiti, ‘The Emergence of a Community Administration: The Case of European 
Agencies’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 309 at 315– 317.
23 Two examples of many: Art 42(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/ 2009 of 26 February 2009 on the 
Community trade mark (codified version) (OJ [2009] L78/ 1) as amended by Regulation (EU) 2015/ 2424 of the 
EP and the Council of 16 December 2015 (OJ 2015 L 241/ 21); Art 62 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/ 94 
of 22 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights (OJ [1994] L227/ 1), as amended.
24 This was, eg in Case T- 187/ 06 Schräder v Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) [2008] ECR II- 3151, 
confirmed on appeal in Case C- 38/ 09 P Schräder v Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) [2010] ECR I- 3209.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Apr 11 2017, NEWGEN
he-9780198789130-ch6-10.indd   203 4/11/2017   3:41:09 PM
 8 general principles Of eu law and eu administrative law 204
 
How, then, does an EU agency receive a mandate to exercise its powers, by whom, why, 
and within which limits? Delegation of powers in the EU is generally discussed in the 
context of the Meroni case from the very early days of European integration.25 There the 
Court examined the question whether and to what extent the Commission (which was 
then called the High Authority) could delegate powers under Article 53 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) for the operation of the 
supply of ferrous scrap to two bodies it had set up on the basis of Belgian private law.26 
In Meroni, the Court explicitly allowed sub- delegation of Commission powers to private 
parties, despite the lack of explicit authorization in the ECSC Treaty. It, however, set some 
conditions for such sub- delegation:  first, the Commission was authorized only to sub- 
delegate powers which it had previously been granted. Thereby, the Court reconfirmed 
the principle of conferral and prohibited actions ultra vires.27 Secondly, the Commission 
had to control the exercise of the sub- delegated powers.28 Thirdly, the Commission was 
barred from delegating powers to private parties which would allow them to adopt acts 
with quasi- legislative content because doing so would upset the ‘institutional balance’ of 
powers conferred on institutions in the ECSC Treaty.29
This reference to ‘institutional balance’— a principle akin to the separation of powers— is 
the reason for also applying the standards set by Meroni today in the context of the EU.30 
Today, therefore, it is established that under EU law delegation of clearly defined powers, 
the exercise of which is subject to its supervision, is possible.31 Most EU agencies, which 
are established by EU legislative acts, are based on Treaty provisions permitting the adop-
tion of ‘measures’ for the harmonization or approximation of national law such as, most 
importantly, Article 114 TFEU (the general legal base for the adoption of internal market 
measures), and subsidiarity, Article 352 TFEU (which gives residual power for the EU to 
act to attain one of its objectives, if the Treaties have not set out the necessary powers). Also, 
policy- specific powers exist allowing for the creation of structural ‘measures’ (ie agencies).32
3  Criteria for legality
In the day- to- day application of EU law, one of the most central questions which needs 
to be asked and answered concerns the legality of an act or action of an institution body 
or agency acting within a policy covered by EU law. In order to answer such a question, 
it is necessary to have a set of criteria in mind which can be used as mental guidance for 
25 Joined Cases 9/ 56 and 10/ 56 Meroni v ECSC High Authority [1957– 8] ECR English Special Edition 133.
26 These were the ‘Joint Bureau of Ferrous Scrap Consumers’ and the ‘Imported Ferrous Scrap Equalization Fund’.
27 Meroni (n 25) para 150. 28 Meroni (n 25) para 152. 29 Meroni (n 25) para 152.
30 See eg Case C- 345/ 00 P FNAB v Council [2001] ECR I- 3811, para 41 (on the relevance of the concept of 
institutional balance); Case C- 301/ 02 P Tralli v European Central Bank [2005] ECR I- 4071, paras 41– 44; Case 
C- 164/ 98 P DIR Films International v Commission [2000] ECR I- 447, paras 52– 55. On the limits to delegate 
by legislative act the right to amend an annex to such legislation by means of implementing acts (under the 
pre- Lisbon system), see Joined Cases C- 154/ 04 and C- 155/ 04 Alliance for Natural Health [2005] ECR I- 6451, 
para 90.
31 Case C- 270/ 12 UK v EP and Council (ESMA— Short Selling) EU:C:2014:18.
32 See eg in the area of research, Arts 182, fifth para, and 187 TFEU; in the environmental field Art 192 
TFEU (the legal basis for the European Environmental Agency (OJ [2009] L126/ 13)); in the air and maritime 
transport field Art 100, second para, TFEU; regarding border checks, asylum, and immigration in the context 
of the so- called ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, Arts 74 and 77(2)d) TFEU (the latter is the legal basis 
for the creation of the EU’s external borders agency, Frontex (now Regulation 2016/ 1624, OJ 2016 L 251/ 1); 
see further  chapters 5 and 26).
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analysing a case. Not all the principles listed here will give rise to rights of individuals or 
will be applicable in every case, but keeping them in mind as a checklist will be extremely 
helpful for structuring answers to a real- life problem.
General, overarching criteria for the legality of acts of the EU exist mostly in the form of 
general principles of law.33 These general principles of EU law34 have a constitutional status 
in that they bind Union institutions in the exercise of their legislative and administra-
tive competences. Their function is to provide a guide to the interpretation of Union law, 
including the Treaties, to constitute grounds for the review of Union law, whether directly 
based on the Treaties themselves or subordinate acts, and to establish a basis for the non- 
contractual liability of the Union (Articles 268 and 340, second and third paragraphs, 
TFEU). In addition, such principles also have to be observed by the Member States when 
they implement Union law35 and where they derogate from it,36 that is, in all cases which 
‘fall within the scope of Community law’.37
In the following, I  will first discuss proportionality (section 3.1), then various addi-
tional sub- elements of the rule of law including transparency, legality, and the protection 
of legitimate expectations (section 3.2). The discussion then turns to principles of good 
administration including the right to a fair hearing, to a reasoned act, and further rights of 
defence (section 3.3). This is followed by a discussion of information rights (section 3.4) 
and the right to an effective judicial remedy (section 3.5).
3.1  Proportionality
Article 5(4) TEU states that ‘Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of 
Union action, shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.’ The 
real content and relevance of the principle of proportionality, however, arises only from the 
interpretation given to it in the case law of the Court of Justice. Long before the principle of 
proportionality was recognized in what is now Article 5(4) TEU, the Court had developed 
proportionality as a general principle of EU law. It might now be regarded as, directly or 
indirectly, the most widely used general principle of EU law. One of the reasons for this is 
that proportionality is a very versatile principle serving to review the legality of:
● acts of EU institutions and bodies when limiting or regulating the exercise of rights 
of individuals (eg the Commission adopts a decision fining a company for violation 
of EU antitrust law under Article 101 TFEU);38
● acts of EU institutions and bodies when limiting Member State powers by adopting 
EU acts (eg an EU directive of a legislative nature on the maximum working time of 
workers per week);39
33 The European Parliament has now called on the Commission to present a legislative proposal for a gen-
eral act on administrative procedures to be followed by EU institutions and bodies when implementing EU 
law. So far, however, there is no standard EU ‘administrative procedure act’ or similar code or legal framework 
horizontally applicable throughout the policy areas touched by EU integration. The same is true at national 
level, as regards the national implementation of EU law: see  chapter 6.
34 General principles of law often include principles requiring standards of procedural justice in adminis-
trative procedures, eg the notions of proportionality, right of defence, and others.
35 See Case 5/ 88 Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 2609.
36 Case C- 260/ 89 ERT v DEP [1991] ECR I- 2925.
37 Ibid, para. 42. See also Case C- 263/ 97 First City Trading [1998] ECR I- 5537.
38 Joined Cases C- 189, 202, 205– 208 and 213/ 02 P Dansk Rørindustri v Commission [2005] ECR I- 5425. On 
EU competition law, see further  chapter 17.
39 Case C- 84/ 94 UK v Council (‘Working Time Directive’) [1996] ECR I- 5755. On this legislation, see further 
 chapter 20.
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● indirectly, in case of acts of Member State bodies when implementing EU law (eg 
the Dutch veterinary authorities confiscate Ms Jippes’s pet sheep in order to com-
ply with an EU regulation on the limitation of the outbreak of viral veterinary 
diseases);40
● acts of Member States when limiting or regulating in the context of rights or free-
doms guaranteed by EU law (eg Greek authorities decide not to grant a broadcasting 
licence to a private TV station).41
The Court of Justice has developed the review of compliance with the principle of propor-
tionality as a three- step test:
● Under the first level ‘the principle of proportionality requires that measures adopted by 
European Union institutions do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and neces-
sary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question.’42
● Secondly, ‘when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse 
must be had to the least onerous’.43 The notion of ‘least onerous’ therefore requires a 
clear definition of the rights in question.
● Thirdly, ‘the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued’,44 
that is, there must be an overall reasonable ratio between means and outcome.
Case study 8.1: Broadcasting of sports events in news programmes
The use of the proportionality test is best explained using a practical example such as the Sky 
Österreich case.45 This case concerned the legality of a provision of an EU directive requiring 
companies which had acquired exclusive broadcasting licences for sports events also to allow 
limited reporting of those events by other, competing, channels. In review of the compliance 
of this requirement with the ‘freedom to conduct a business’, a right under Article 16 of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Court found that this right needed to be balanced 
with the right to the freedom to receive information under Article 11(2) Charter. With 
regard to the first step of the proportionality test, the Court found that ‘safeguarding of the 
freedoms protected under Article 11 of the Charter undoubtedly constitutes a legitimate 
aim in the general interest’.46 The directive was also considered ‘appropriate for the purpose 
of ensuring that the objective pursued is achieved’ in that it allowed any broadcaster ‘to be 
able to make short news reports and thus to inform the general public of events of high 
interest.’47 In its analysis of the second leg of the proportionality test, the Court first explored 
which measures would have been conceivable which were capable of reaching the legitimate 
legislative goal but were at the same time less restrictive for the rights of the plaintiff. It 
considered, for example, the possibility of granting the rights holder the right partially 
to recover the costs of acquisition of the exclusive sports broadcasting rights. The Court, 
however, found that this less restrictive option would not achieve the objective pursued 
by the directive. It would effectively further restrict the access of the general public to the 
40 Case C- 189/ 01 Jippes [2001] ECR I- 5689. 41 Case C- 260/ 89 ERT v DEP [1991] ECR I- 2925.
42 See eg Case C- 343/ 09 Afton Chemical [2010] ECR I- 7027, para 45, and Joined Cases C- 581/ 10 and C- 629/ 10 
Nelson, EU:C:2012:657, para 71.
43 See eg Afton Chemical (n 41) para 45, and Nelson (n 41) para 71.
44 See eg Afton Chemical (n 41) para 45, and Nelson (n 41) para 71.
45 Case C- 283/ 11 Sky Österreich, EU:C:2013:28.   46 Ibid, para 52.   47 Ibid, para 53.
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information.48 The Court then turned to the third step of the proportionality test regarding 
the overall disproportionality of the directive. The Court found that the EU legislature had 
struck a fair ‘balance between’ the rights of the parties involved by limiting the broadcasting 
rights of the short news reports only to specific types of general news programmes and 
by requiring them to cite the source of the information.49 Thereby, the disadvantages 
resulting for the rights holder were ‘not disproportionate in the light of the aims’ which the 
directive pursues and were ‘such as to ensure a fair balance between the various rights and 
fundamental freedoms at issue in the case.’50
As noted, the principle of proportionality is applied in many different contexts. Within these 
different contexts, the degree of judicial review varies. In some cases, the Court (as described 
in  chapter 5) will apply only marginal review and thereby only check for manifest errors of 
assessment in the different steps of application of the proportionality test.51 This is especially 
the case where the institutions enjoy wide legislative discretion. The reason for the judicial 
self- restraint in these cases is that the Court is reluctant to replace the assessment of the 
legislature with its own assessment of the politically desirable outcome. Such restraint is 
therefore a question of respect for the separation of powers as expressed in Article 13(2) 
TEU. Increasingly, therefore, in the context of the review of legislative acts of the Union, the 
Court does not review the substance of an act but instead checks whether the institutions can 
prove that they themselves reviewed the proportionality of a measure before adopting it.52
In areas other than the review of EU legislation, the Court tends to exercise less judicial 
self- restraint and will conduct a more full review of the proportionality of an act. Such 
cases include:
● those where the institutions have no or only limited discretion— this is often the case 
in matters of administrative acts implementing legislation,53
● acts of Member States which limit EU fundamental rights or fundamental freedoms,54
48 Ibid, paras 55– 57.   49 Ibid, paras 58– 63.   50 Ibid, paras 66 and 67.
51 Working Time Directive (n 39), para 58:
As to judicial review of those conditions, however, the Council must be allowed a wide discretion in an 
area which, as here, involves the legislature in making social political choices and requires it to carry 
out complex assessments. Judicial review of the exercise of that discretion must therefore be limited to 
examining whether it has been vitiated by manifest error of misuse of powers, or whether the institution 
concerned has manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion (emphasis added).
That means that although the Court reviews the different elements of discretion, it only reviews manifest errors 
in each of the steps.
52 One way for the legislature to do just that is to prove that it has undertaken an impact assessment study 
weighing the effects of various policy alternatives and analysing the cost– benefit relation between a measure 
and its disadvantages to other rights and principles. eg Case C- 58/ 08 Vodafone [2010] ECR I- 4999, paras 51 
et seq; Case C- 176/ 09 Luxembourg v European Parliament and Council [2011] ECR I- 3727, paras 56 et seq.
53 Case T- 170/ 06 Alrosa v Commission [2007] ECR II- 2601, paras 108– 110; Case C- 12/ 03 P Commission v 
Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I- 987, paras 38– 40.
54 See eg Case C- 200/ 02 Catherine Chen v Secretary of State [2004] ECR I- 9925, para 32; Case C- 413/ 99 
Baumbast [2002] ECR I- 7091, paras 90 and 91; Case C- 41/ 02 Commission v Netherlands (‘Vitamins drops’) 
[2004] ECR I- 11375, para 46:
However, in exercising their discretion relating to the protection of public health, the Member States 
must comply with the principle of proportionality. The means which they choose must therefore be 
confined to what is actually necessary to ensure the safeguarding of public health; they must be pro-
portional to the objective thus pursued, which could not have been attained by measures which are less 
restrictive of intra- Community trade.
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● acts of the institutions which restrict the scope of applicability of a fundamental 
right or balance various rights and principles against each other.55 This is now an 
explicit obligation under Article 52(1) Charter which reads: ‘Subject to the principle 
of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely 
meet objectives of general interest’. An example of this is the previously discussed Sky 
Österreich case in case study 8.1.
3.2  Rule of law: transparency, legality, legal certainty,  
legitimate expectations
The rule of law is, like the principle of democracy (see  chapters 3 and 4), a foundational 
constitutional principle from which other principles and rules emanate. This chapter will 
not therefore present a comprehensive account of the rule of law’s sub- elements but will 
focus on the relevant criteria for the review of the legality of acts for implementing EU 
policies.
The EU is established, as famously pronounced by the Court in Les Verts, as a 
‘Community based on the rule of law’.56 Although there is a lively academic debate about 
what that actually means in practice, most people would agree that the rule of law is an 
‘umbrella principle’ with some core content and numerous (sub- )principles, many of 
which can in themselves be regarded as having a certain independent existence.57 In this 
understanding, the rule of law contains both elements which arise primarily as criteria 
for the legality of legislative acts and others which relate more directly to the exercise of 
administrative functions. The following is a selection of some of the main sub- elements of 
the rule of law within the EU’s legal system.
3.2.1  Legality
One requirement of the rule of law is that actions of public bodies of the EU take place 
under and within the law. This means that, first, a legal basis is required (the principle of 
conferral under Article 5(2) TEU) which can be traced to primary law: ‘Public authorities 
must have a legal basis and be justified on the grounds laid down by law’.58 Secondly, the 
institutions and bodies must act within the limits of the powers so conferred on them. 
They may not, therefore, act ultra vires and have to comply with the procedural rules 
spelt out in their specific legal basis. In other words, the hierarchy of legal norms must be 
recognized and respected in that no act may violate higher level Union law,59 including 
fundamental rights and other general principles in EU law.60
A further consequence of the rule of law is the requirement of the correct exercise of 
discretionary power, where such discretionary powers are conferred on the institution or 
body.61 in particular, the institution or body must take into account all relevant factors 
for decision- making but is barred from acting on improper motives leading to misuse of 
55 eg Sky Österreich (n 45) paras 47– 66 and pre- entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: Case 
C- 295/ 94 Hüpeden [1996] ECR I- 3375 and Case C- 296/ 94 Pietsch [1996] ECR I- 3409.
56 Case 294/ 83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para 23.
57 For many, see K Lenaerts, ‘The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System of the European 
Union’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 1625.
58 Joined Cases 46/ 87 and 227/ 88 Hoechst v Commission [1989] ECR 2859, summary point 3.
59 Case 1/ 54 France v High Authority [1954] ECR 7, 23; Case 38/ 70 Deutsche Tradax GmbH v Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1971] ECR 145, para 10.
60 See eg Case 240/ 83 Procureur de la République v ADBHU [1985] ECR 531.
61 Case 18/ 57 Nold KG v ECSC High Authority [1959] ECR 89.
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its powers. As in any exercise of public powers, therefore, they must act in good faith and 
avoid any improper purpose.62
3.2.2  Legal and institutional transparency
Legal and institutional transparency is essential for the exercise of the rule of law and can 
be regarded as a precondition for establishing an accountable legal and political system.
Transparency, however, has multiple meanings and facts. In a narrow interpretation, 
it might be seen as referring to a minimal openness of process, access to documents, and 
publication of official measures. With respect to transparency in the sense of access to 
documents and freedom of information, a key Treaty provision is Article 15 TFEU, which, 
inter alia, expressly requires that the proceedings of all bodies are transparent (paragraph 
(3), third subparagraph), for example by publication of ‘documents relating to the legisla-
tive procedures’ (see Case study 8.2).63 Also, the legislature under Article 297 TFEU has 
the duty to publish all legislative measures and decisions. Access to documents is also 
restated in terms of an individual right in Article 42 Charter. Details are laid down by 
Regulation 1049/ 2001 on public access to documents.64
Case study 8.2: Tennis racquets on board planes?
Airport authorities at Vienna airport refused Mr Heinrich the right to board a plane 
because they found a tennis racquet in his cabin luggage. According to their information, 
tennis racquets were amongst the items prohibited from being carried on planes. Mr 
Heinrich, outraged about missing his flight, brought a case before the competent Austrian 
administrative court asking for a declaration that it was illegal for the authorities to refuse 
to allow him to board his plane with a racquet in his luggage.65
The Austrian court noted that the authorities were acting on the basis of an EU 
regulation (622/ 2003) but, that it was impossible for individuals to comply with that 
regulation, since the annex to the regulation listing prohibited items on planes had not 
been published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Keeping secret the rules 
of conduct with which individuals are required to comply constituted, in the view of 
the Austrian court, a severe impairment of the most elementary principles of the rule of 
law. Such regulations should therefore be declared by the Court of Justice as legally non- 
existent and hence non- binding.
The Court of Justice, in a preliminary ruling, adopted a slightly more differentiated 
position. It held that the annex to Regulation 622/ 2003 adapting the list of articles prohibited 
on- board an aircraft, which was not published in the Official Journal, had no binding force 
insofar as it seeks to impose obligations on individuals and therefore cannot be enforced 
62 Art 263, second para, TFEU, dealing with actions for annulment before the Court of Justice, makes the 
application of these principles explicit in providing that actions against all EU institutions in respect of mea-
sures having legal effects may be based on the grounds of ‘lack of competence, infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or 
misuse of powers’ (see further  chapter 10).
63 Case C- 345/ 06 Heinrich [2009] ECR I- 1659, paras 41– 47 and 64– 66.
64 Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ [2001] L145/ 43). Replacement 
by a revised measure is currently being discussed among the institutions. See further  chapter 3.
65 See Case C- 345/ 06 Gottfried Heinrich [2009] ECR I- 1659, paras 42– 44 and 59– 63.
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against individuals. Article 297(2) TFEU states clearly that EU law cannot take effect in law 
unless it has been published in the Official Journal. The Court held that
an act adopted by a community institution cannot be enforced against natural and 
legal persons in a member state before they have the opportunity to make themselves 
acquainted with it by its proper publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
in particular, the principle of legal certainly requires that community rules enable those 
concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations which are imposed on them. 
individuals must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are 
and take steps accordingly.
As a consequence, the Court declared that all the relevant implementing acts to the EU 
Regulation could not be enforced against individuals. Until proper publication, tennis 
racquets and other secretly listed items could be taken on- board. The Vienna authorities’ 
refusal to let Mr Heinrich board the plane with the racquet was therefore illegal.
In a broader sense, transparency is a structural principle for a legal system— something 
which might be lacking in the EU due to a certain lack of visibility as regards the allocation 
of final responsibility for decisions made. This can be a consequence of the complex multi- 
level structures of decision- making seeking to include various interests. The complexity 
of the legal system is also a result of the evolution of EU law through successive layers of 
Treaty amendments and of developments in institutional practice, and the varying speed 
of integration through national ‘opt- ins’ and ‘opt- outs’. Transparency of a system is directly 
linked to the possibility of holding actors to account and therefore interacts with certain 
other important precepts such as legal and institutional responsibility.66
3.2.3  Legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations
The principle of legal certainty and the principle of the protection of legitimate expecta-
tions are both sub- concepts of the rule of law. They are consequently protected under 
EU law and are criteria for the legality of acts adopted on the basis of or in the scope of 
EU law.
Legal certainty
Legal certainty is acknowledged as a general principle of EU law.67 According to the Court 
of Justice the principle essentially requires two things:
● ‘Legal rules be clear and precise, and aim to ensure that situations and legal relation-
ships governed by Community law remain foreseeable’.68
● ‘Individuals must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations 
are and take steps accordingly’.69
66 See Case T- 188/ 97 Rothmans International BV v Commission [1999] ECR II- 2463.
67 Case C 55/ 91 Italien v Commission [1993] ECR I- 4813, para 66; Joined Cases T- 55/ 93 and T- 232/ 94, T- 
233/ 94 and T- 234/ 94 Industrias Pesqueras Campos v Commission [1996] ECR II- 247, paras 76, 116, and 119; 
Case 43/ 75 Defrenne v SABENA [1976] ECR 455, paras 69 et seq; Case C- 143/ 93 Gebroeders van Es Douane 
Agenten v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1996] ECR I- 431, para 27; Joined Cases 205– 215/ 82 
Deutsche Milchkontor v Germany [1983] ECR 2633.
68 Case C- 199/ 03 Ireland v Commission [2005] ECR I- 8027, para 69. See also Case C- 29/ 08 SKF [2009] ECR 
I- 10413, para 77.
69 See eg Case C- 158/ 06 ROM- projecten [2007] ECR I- 5103, para 25 with further references.
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Practically speaking, this has a series of consequences, for example:
● EU institutions are barred from applying rules to individuals which are inconsistent 
or contradictory;70
● double jeopardy (also known as the principle of ne bis in idem in criminal law and 
embodied in Article 50 Charter in comparable terms) is prohibited;
● administrative proceedings must be conducted within a reasonable period of time;71
● there is a requirement of legal certainty with respect to legal charges and limitation 
periods;72
● retroactive effect of EU law is, in principle, prohibited.
The latter is, from a practical point of view, probably the most important consequence of 
the principle of legal certainty. Article 297(1) TFEU lays down that Union acts come into 
force only after publication, which implies that retroactive entry into force is in principle 
excluded.73 Retroactive effect of Union law is exceptionally possible if such effect explic-
itly follows from Union law74 and if the public interest in retroactive effect overrides the 
private interest in the maintenance of the existing legal situation.75 This indicates that bal-
ancing of interests in maintenance of different principles, for example that of the public in 
upholding the law and that of private parties in legal certainty, is necessary.76 This require-
ment for balancing of the public interest in upholding the law and the private interest in 
maintaining a previously acquired legal position can be well illustrated when looking at 
questions of revocation of acts and recovery of monies. These are instances of application 
of the principle of legal certainty which relate to acts of individual application.
The case law with regard to revocation of acts of Union institutions, distinguishes lawful 
acts from those which have a legal defect (unlawful acts). It is important to recall that even 
unlawful acts, if not challenged and annulled (eg following an action for annulment before 
the Courts under Article 263 TFEU), are valid and have effect. This is one of the conse-
quences of the principle of legal certainty.77
70 Case T- 115/ 94 Opel Austria v Council [1997] ECR II- 39, para 125; Gebroeders van Es Douane Agenten 
(n 66) para 27; there the Commission was held to be ‘under an obligation to amend those regulations’ which 
were detrimental to the principle of legal certainty, which requires that an individual will be able ‘to ascertain 
unequivocally what his rights and obligations are and take steps accordingly’.
71 Case T- 347/ 03 Branco v Commission [2005] ECR II- 2555, para 114; Case T- 125/ 01 José Martí Peix v 
Commission [2003] ECR II- 865, para 111; Joined Cases T- 44/ 01, T- 119/ 01 and T- 126/ 01 Vieira v Commission 
[2003] ECR II- 1209, para 167.
72 Case T- 240/ 02 Koninklijke Coöperatie Cosun v Commission [2004] ECR II- 4237, paras 38, 44, 45, 58, 61, 
and 62; Case 41/ 69 Chemiefarma v Commission [1970] ECR 661, para 16; Case T- 144/ 02 Eagle v Commission 
[2007] ECR II- 2721, paras 64 and 65.
73 Joined Cases T- 64/ 01 and T- 65/ 01 Afrikanische Frucht- Compagnie v Council and Commission [2004] 
ECR II- 521, para 90; Case 98/ 78 Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1979] ECR 69, para 20. This fundamental 
approach is also recognized within the legal systems of the Member States (see by comparison Case 63/ 83 
Regina Kirk [1984] ECR 2689, para 22) and established with regard to criminal sanctions in Art 49(1) Charter 
and Art 7 ECHR.
74 See Case T- 357/ 02 Freistaat Sachsen v Commission [2007] ECR II- 1261, para 98, where the Court stated 
that ‘provisions of Community law have no retroactive effect unless, exceptionally, it clearly follows from their 
terms or general scheme that such was the intention of the legislature, that the purpose to be achieved so 
demands and that the legitimate expectations of those concerned are duly respected’.
75 For the public interests recognized by the Court, see T Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law 
(2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 256– 257.
76 Joined Cases 42/ 59 and 49/ 59 SNUPAT v High Authority [1961] ECR English Special Edition 53.
77 See also  chapter 10.
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Lawful acts, in particular those creating rights for individuals or Member States, may 
not in principle be revoked since, generally, the interest of the individual in the continuous 
application of the act prevails over the public interest of revocation.78
On the other hand, the retroactive revocation of unlawful acts is
permissible provided that the withdrawal occurs within a reasonable time and provided that 
the institution from which it emanates has had sufficient regard to how far the applicant might 
have been led to rely on the lawfulness of the measure.79
Similar concerns govern the question of recovery of monies. This is important, for exam-
ple, in the area of subsidies which in EU law are called ‘State aid’. National aid granted to 
companies is in principle subject to authorization by the Commission. The question arose 
in Alcan80 as to whether such a recipient was individually affected by a determination of 
the Commission that the aid, which had already been advanced to the company by the 
national government, was unlawful. Could the principle of legal certainty be invoked by 
Alcan to avoid the sanction of repayment of the aid which was now declared unlawful?81
Legitimate expectations
The principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is a general legal principle of 
Union law, which has been recognized since the very early case law of the Court.82 It is 
closely linked to that of legal certainty in that it gives individuals a right to rely on the 
validity of acts of Union institutions.83 The issue of legitimate expectations arises par-
ticularly often where an administrative decision is cancelled or revoked. The entitlement 
to protection on the basis of legitimate expectations requires that three key elements are 
satisfied:
● The existence of justifiable reliance84 (this can arise from a valid legislative act,85 but 
can also arise from any act of a Union official conferring individual rights or benefits, 
for example by giving precise assurances, which can give rise to protected ‘legitimate 
expectations’86).
78 See Joined Cases 7/ 56 and 3– 7/ 57 Algera v Common Assembly [1957– 8] ECR 39. See also Case 159/ 82 
Verli- Wallace v Commission [1983] ECR 2711, para 8; Case T- 123/ 89 Chomel v Commission [1990] ECR II- 
131, para 34; Case T- 197/ 99 Gooch v Commission [2000] ECR II- 1247, para 52; Case T- 251/ 00 Lagardère and 
Canal+ v Commission [2002] ECR II- 4825, para 139.
79 Lagardère and Canal+ (n 78)  para. 140. See also Case 14/ 81 Alpha Steel v Commission [1982] ECR 
749; Case 15/ 85 Consorzio Cooperative d’Abruzzo v Commission [1987] ECR 1005; Case C- 24/ 89 Cargill v 
Commission [1991] ECR I- 2987; Case C- 365/ 89 Cargill v Produktschap voor Margarine, Vetten en Oliën [1991] 
ECR I- 3045; Case C- 90/ 95 P De Compte v Parliament [1997] ECR I- 1999; Gooch (n 78) para 53. See Case 15/ 
60 Simon v Court of Justice [1961] ECR 239; Case 54/ 77 Herpels v Commission [1978] ECR 585.
80 Case C- 24/ 95 Land Rheinland- Pfalz v Alcan Deutschland [1993] ECR I- 1591.
81 The Court, in balancing the principles of legal certainty, on the one hand, against legality and effective-
ness of EU law, on the other hand, requested repayment because otherwise Union law prohibiting State aid 
would be ‘deprived of effectiveness’ (see Land Rheinland- Pfalz (n 80) paras 36 and 37).
82 See Case 111/ 63 Lemmerz- Werke [1962] ECR English Special Edition 239, where the concept of protec-
tion of legitimate expectations was first explicitly enunciated. See also Algera (n 78), 118; SNUPAT (n 76) 103, 
111, and 172 et seq; Case 14/ 61 Hoogovens v ECSC High Authority [1962] ECR 511, 511, and 548 (English 
Special Edition, 53).
83 Cases C- 177/ 99 and C- 181/ 99 Ampafrance und Sanofi [2000] ECR I- 7013, para 67, where the Court 
regarded the principle of legitimate expectations as a ‘corollary of the principle of legal certainty’.
84 Case T- 176/ 01 Ferriere Nord Spa v Commission [2004] ECR II- 3931.
85 See Case 120/ 86 Mulder v Minister van Landbouw en Visserij [1988] ECR 2321; Case 170/ 86 Van Deetzen 
v Hauptzollamt Hamburg- Jonas [1988] ECR 2355.
86 Case T- 283/ 02 EnBW ECLI:EU:T:2013:223, para 89.
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● An affected interest87 (expectations of the continuous existence of a future legal situation 
are not protected under Union law, if the beneficiary knew that the situation or assur-
ance was illegal,88 for example due to incorrect facts which the potential beneficiary had 
given.89 Also, legitimate expectations cannot arise if the alleged assurance was made con-
trary to Union law, for example in the form of a promise not to apply or enforce the law90).
● Priority for the protection of expectations over the interest of the Union.
Case study 8.3: Tobacco farmers
Mr Crispoltoni was a tobacco farmer from Lerchi, in the region of Umbria in Italy. He 
belonged to a producers’ association which processed leaf tobacco produced by its members 
and paid to its farmers an advance for the amount of leaf tobacco delivered by each 
farmer. The price was established by the association on the basis of a Council regulation 
on minimum pricing for agriculture markets for that year. During the season of 1988— 
after the farmers had planted the tobacco in April, but before the harvest— the maximum 
quantity of tobacco which profited from the guaranteed minimum price was reduced by 
the Commission in an implementing regulation. The association therefore requested its 
farmers, including Mr Crispoltoni, to repay part of the advance they had received.
Mr Crispoltoni turned to the local court against the demand by the association. The 
local court in turn requested a preliminary reference from the Court of Justice expressing 
doubt as to the validity of the regulations on the ground that they could be contrary to the 
principles of the protection of legitimate expectations, the non- retroactivity of legal rules, 
and legal certainty.
The Court found that the planting of the tobacco plants in April involved the greatest 
expense to the farmers. Since the Commission regulation was published only after the 
tobacco farmers had made their decisions on how much to plant that year, the regulation 
for all practical purposes ‘had retroactive effect’. The Court found that
although in general the principle of legal certainty precludes a community measure from 
taking effect from a point in time before its publication, it may exceptionally be otherwise 
where the purpose to be achieved so demands and where the legitimate expectations of 
those concerned are duly respected. that case- law also applies where the retroactivity is 
not expressly laid down by the measure itself but is the result of its content.91
In this case, the Court held that the ‘legitimate expectations of the operators concerned were 
not respected, in so far as the measures adopted, although foreseeable, were introduced at a 
time when they could no longer be taken into account’ by the farmers since they were not 
‘notified in good time of any measures having effects on their investments’.92
The case nicely illustrates both the notion of protection of legitimate expectations and 
the difficulties which in reality exist when analysing the retroactive effect of a measure. 
These issues are staples of administrative litigation in the EU.
87 Case 74/ 74 CNTA v Commission [1975] ECR 533, para 44.
88 EnBW (n 86) para 113. See also Case T- 13/ 99 Pfizer Animal Health v Council [2002] ECR II- 3305, para 501.
89 Case 228/ 84 Pauvert v Court of Auditors [1985] ECR 1973, para 14.
90 See Joined Cases 303/ 81 and 312/ 81 Klöckner v Commission [1983] ECR 1507, para 34; Case 188/ 82 
Thyssen v Commission [1983] ECR 3721, para 11; Case 162/ 84 Vlachou v Court of Auditors [1986] ECR 459, 
para 6.
91 Case C- 368/ 89 Crispoltoni I [1991] ECR I- 3695, para 17. 92 Ibid, para 20.
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3.3  Good administration
The notion of good administration in the legal system of the EU is still evolving. It is 
perhaps best understood as an ‘umbrella’ concept containing rights, rules, and principles 
guiding administrative procedures.
3.3.1  General observations on good administration
The Court of Justice has referred to notions of ‘good’,93 ‘sound’,94 or ‘proper’95 administra-
tion since the very early case law.96 Good administration97 has now also been described 
as a ‘principle’,98 as well as a ‘general principle’ of EU law.99 It is thereby a right recog-
nized as a general principle of EU law (Article 6(3) TEU). With the entry into force of the 
Charter under the Treaty of Lisbon, good administration is also recognized as a binding 
fundamental right under Article 41 Charter, pursuant to Article 6(1) TEU, which gives the 
Charter the ‘same legal value’ as the Treaties (see  chapter 9).
Article 41 Charter reads:
1. every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a 
reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the union.
2. this right includes:
a) the right of every person to be heard, before any individual measure which would 
affect him or her adversely is taken;
b) the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the legiti-
mate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy;
c) the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions.
3. every person has the right to have the union make good any damage caused by its institu-
tions or by its servants in the performance of their duties, in accordance with the general 
principles common to the laws of the member states.
4. every person may write to the institutions of the union in one of the languages of the 
treaties and must have an answer in the same language.
93 Case 32/ 62 Alvis [1963] ECR 49, para 1A; Joined Cases 56/ 64 and 58/ 64 Consten and Grundig v 
Commission [1966] ECR 299.
94 The first mention of the principle of sound administration was made in relation to the requirement to 
process an application within a reasonable time in the Joined Cases 1/ 57 and 14/ 57 Société des usines à tubes de 
la Sarre [1957] ECR 105, para 113.
95 Case C- 255/ 90 P Burban [1992] ECR I- 2253, paras 7 and 12; Case T- 167/ 94 Nölle v Council and 
Commission [1995] ECR II- 2589, para 53.
96 Algera (n 78); Case 64/ 82 Tradax v Commission [1984] ECR 1359.
97 In several cases, the infringements protected under the notion of good administration were either not 
sufficient or did not bear on the outcome of decision- making and thus did not lead to the annulment of the 
decision of the Commission: Case T- 62/ 98 Volkswagen v Commission [2000] ECR II- 2707, paras 279– 283; 
Case C- 338/ 00 P Volkswagen v Commission [2003] ECR I- 9189, paras 163– 165; Case T- 308/ 94 Cascades SA 
v Commission [1998] ECR II- 925, para 61; Case C- 476/ 08 P Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission [2009] ECR 
I- 207, paras 33– 35.
98 Case T- 83/ 91 Tetra Pak International v Commission [1994] ECR II- 755, paras 24– 31.
99 Joined Cases 33/ 79 and 75/ 79 Kuhner v Commission [1980] ECR 1677, para 25 (here, the Court explains 
that good administration is, by contrast to the more specific right of defence, ‘only’ a general principle of law); 
Case T- 54/ 99 max.mobil [2002] ECR II- 313, para 48. See also Case T- 198/ 01 R Technische Glaswerke Illmenau 
GmbH v Commission [2002] ECR II- 2153, para 85, and Case T- 211/ 02 Tideland Signal v Commission [2002] 
ECR II- 3781, para 37.
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Failure to comply with the principles of good administration may, in cases of sufficient 
seriousness of the breach, result in a manifest error of assessment and thus lead to an 
annulment of a decision due to its illegality,100 with the possible consequence of rights to 
damages for violation of procedural principles.101
By comparison to the protection of the principle of good administration in the case 
law of the Court, the formulation of Article 41 Charter is significantly more limited in its 
material, institutional, and personal scope. Therefore whether good administration will be 
evoked to exist under Article 41 Charter, as opposed to granting the same right as a gen-
eral principle of law under Article 6(3) TEU established in the case law of the EU Courts, 
has the potential to change the outcome of a case. This is why:
● the wording of Article 41 Charter indicates that:
– the material scope of protection of good administration is predominantly intended 
to cover ‘single case decision- making’. This arises specifically from the formula-
tions in Article 41 Charter which cover an ‘individual measure’, access of a person 
to ‘his or her’ (specific) file, and the obligation to give reasons for administrative 
decisions— as opposed to the broader obligation of stating reasons in all ‘legal acts’ 
of the Union in Article 296, first paragraph, TFEU;102
– the institutional scope of the right to good administration under Article 41(1) 
Charter is limited to ‘institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union’;103
● the right to good administration as a general principle of EU law (Article 6(3) TEU), 
on the other hand, is also applicable:
– to general acts, for example, for the review of international (association) agree-
ments,104 as well as for non- legislative acts which, as the Court held, must be 
‘adopted by the Commission pursuant to the principle of sound administration 
and the duty of care’;105
– to Member State action in the scope of EU law in line with ERT and Lisrestal case 
law;106
100 Tideland Signal (n 99) para 37. 101 Case T- 62/ 98 Volkswagen (n 97) para 607.
102 J Ziller, ‘Is a Law of Administrative Procedure for the Union Institutions Necessary?’ (2011) 3 Rivista 
italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario 699 at 718, however, notes that ‘nothing impedes applying art. 41 of the 
Charter on the right to good administration also to rule making, including to consultation procedures by the 
Commission’. For an opposite approach, see the Court of Justice in Case C- 221/ 09 AJD Tuna Ltd [2011] ECR 
I- 1655, para 49, where the Court stated that Art 41 Charter does not cover the process of enacting measures 
of general application and the General Court in a recent line of civil service cases, eg Case T- 135/ 05 Crampoli 
v Commission [2006] ECR II- A- 2- 1527, paras 149 and 150; Joined Cases T- 98/ 92 and T- 99/ 92 Di Marzio and 
Lebedef v Commission [1994] ECR II- 541, para 58; Case T- 65/ 92 Arauxo- Dumay v Commission [1993] ECR II- 
597, para 37; Case T- 46/ 90 Devillez v European Parliament [1993] ECR II- 699, para 37, in which it held that the 
Council when establishing acts of abstract general nature was not subject to the obligations equivalent to what 
is now protected in Art 41 Charter and that their violation could therefore not lead to the annulment of an act.
103 Still more limited are the formulations regarding damages and language rights (Art 41(3) and (4) Charter) 
which speak of ‘institutions’ and ‘servants in the performance of their duties’ respectively.
104 Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Case C- 204/ 07 P CAS SpA v Commission [2008] ECR I- 6135, para 146; 
Joined Cases T- 186/ 97, T- 187/ 97, T- 190– 192/ 97, T- 210/ 97, T- 211/ 97, T- 216/ 97, T- 217/ 97, T- 218/ 97, T- 279/ 
97, T- 280/ 97, T- 293/ 97 and T- 147/ 99 Kaufring AG v Commission [2001] ECR II- 1337, para 257.
105 Case C- 248/ 99 P Monsanto [2002] ECR I- 1, paras 91– 93.
106 In the latter case, the Court of Justice held that the applicants’ right to be heard and their right to obtain an 
adequate statement of reasons had been infringed as a consequence of the interlocutor Member State’s failure to 
keep them informed about the Commission’s decision to reduce the economic assistance that the latter had initially 
granted them: Case T- 450/ 93 Lisrestal v Commission [1994] ECR II- 1177; Kaufring (n 104) paras 150– 153. Member 
States are also bound, see e.g. Case C- 166/ 13 Sophie Mukarubega v Seine- Saint- Denis, EU:C:2014:2336, paras 43– 45.
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– under certain conditions to third parties if they have a qualified involvement in an 
administrative procedure.107
3.3.2  Sub- principles of good administration
In certain areas, Article 41 Charter merely defines minimum standards which thus also 
need to be understood in light of the case law of the Courts on the general principle of 
good administration.
The right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly, and within a reasonable 
time: the duty of care
The central feature of the duty of care as such is the obligation of the administration 
impartially and carefully to establish and review the relevant factual and legal elements of 
a case, prior to making decisions or taking other steps.108 This obligation is explicitly one 
of EU institutions as well as Member States’ authorities acting in the scope of EU law.109 
In the context of the right to fair and impartial treatment, the duty of care requires a thor-
ough establishment of facts prior to decisions and other measures. The decision must be 
taken ‘carefully and impartially’,110 requiring the absence both of arbitrary action and of 
unjustified preferential treatment including personal interest. Most obviously this requires 
that there is no conflict of interest. At least for this reason, an interested party is entitled, 
as the General Court has held, to know the identity of persons conducting investigations 
and making decisions.111
The notion of fairness in the wider sense is also relevant for the right to the treat-
ment of an issue ‘within a reasonable time’. After all, ‘slow administration is bad admin-
istration’112 and might be in violation of the concept of legal certainty. This concept is 
reflected in Article 265 TFEU (Article 232 EC), providing a remedy for undue delays in 
decision- making.
Hearing and access to one’s file
Article 41(2)(a) and (b)  Charter address the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram par-
tem or audiatur altera pars) ‘before any individual measure’ which could affect a person 
‘adversely’ is taken. Preparation of a hearing requires access to one’s file.
Matters related to a fair hearing are:
● the right to full information which may affect a person’s position in an administrative 
procedure, especially where sanctions may be involved;113
107 A good example of the analysis of this effect is Case T- 260/ 94 Air Inter SA v Commission [1997] ECR 
II- 997 with discussion by HP Nehl, Principles of Administrative Procedure in EC Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
1999) 91– 94.
108 See in that respect, AG Van Gerven in Case C- 16/ 90 Eugen Nölle v Hauptzollamt Bremen- Freihafen 
[1991] ECR I- 5163.
109 See e.g. Cases C- 166/ 13 Mukarubega v Seine- Saint- Denis EU:C:2014:2336, paras 47– 49; and C- 362/ 14 
Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner EU:C:2015:650, para 63.
110 Case C- 269/ 90 TU München v Hauptzollamt München Mitte [1991] ECR I- 5469, para 14.
111 Case T- 146/ 89 Williams v Court of Auditors [1991] ECR II- 1293, para 40; Case T- 305/ 94 Limburgse Vinyl 
Maatschappij v Commission [1999] ECR II- 931, paras 317 et seq.
112 AG Jacobs in Case C- 270/ 99 P Z v Parliament [2001] ECR I- 9197, para 40, with reference to Art 41 
Charter and claiming that this was ‘a generally recognised principle’.
113 Case 270/ 82 Estel v Commission [1984] ECR 1195, paras 13 et seq; Case 64/ 82 Tradax v Commission 
[1984] ECR 1359, paras 21 et seq; Case C- 34/ 89 Italy v Commission [1990] ECR I- 3603, paras 14 et seq; Case 
T- 100/ 92 La Pietra v Commission [1994] ECR (civil service) I- A- 83, II- 275, paras 43 et seq; Case C- 54/ 95 
Germany v Commission [1999] ECR I- 35, para 118.
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● the right to be informed of:
– the administration’s response to complaints or representations;114
– the outcome of procedures and of decisions made;115
– all matters necessary for their defence,116 including rights of appeal.
The right to a fair hearing as a general principle of EU law must be observed ‘in all pro-
ceedings initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely 
affecting that person’.117 It is protected to the highest degree by the Court of Justice having 
stated that it ‘cannot be excluded or restricted by any legislative provision’.118 As a general 
principle of law, it thus supplements legislation which does not explicitly provide for its 
exercise.119
The right to a fair hearing requires that the party concerned:
● must receive an exact and complete statement of the claims or objections raised,
● must also be given the opportunity to make its views known ‘on the truth and rel-
evance of the facts and circumstances alleged and on the documents used’,120
● must be given right of access to documents and the file (which can be limited in the 
case of confidential information of third parties).
It is less clear when a right to a hearing might exist in situations where the proceedings 
lead to the adoption of an act of general application— such as a legislative act (Article 289 
TFEU), a delegated act (Article 290 TFEU), or an implementing act with effect beyond 
a single case (Article 291 TFEU). Article 11(1) and (3) TEU requires Union institutions 
to hear views and opinions on Union measures and especially to enter into consultation 
procedures. This reinforces the view of the Court in Denmark v Commission121 which had 
found that a right to a hearing is not excluded simply because the basic act is of general 
application. It is not clear, however, whether the hearing in these cases is a subjective right 
of individuals or just a factor for review of the act.
114 Case 179/ 82 Lucchini Siderurgica v Commission [1983] ECR 3083, para 27; Joined Cases 96– 102, 104– 
106 and 110/ 82 NV IAZ International Belgium v Commission [1983] ECR 3369, paras 12 et seq.
115 Case 120/ 73 Lorenz v Germany [1973] ECR 1471, para 5; Case 121/ 73 Markmann v Germany [1973] ECR 
1495, para 5; Case 122/ 73 Nordsee v Germany [1973] ECR 1511, para 5; Case 141/ 73 Lohrey v Germany [1973] 
ECR 1527, para 5; see also R Bauer, Das Recht auf eine gute Verwaltung im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht 
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002) 64.
116 Case 41/ 69 Chemiefarma v Commission [1970] ECR 661, para 27.
117 Case T- 306/ 01 Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2005] ECR 
II- 3533, para 325.
118 Case T- 260/ 94 Air Inter v Commission [1997] ECR II- 997, para 60; Case C- 135/ 92 Fiskano v Commission 
[1994] ECR I- 2885, para 39.
119 Case 234/ 84 Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR 2263, para 27; Case 259/ 85 France v Commission [1987] 
ECR 4393, para 12.
120 See eg Cases 100– 103/ 80 Musique Diffusion française v Commission [1983] ECR 1835, para 10; Case 121/ 
76 Moli v Commission [1977] ECR 1971, para 19; Case 322/ 81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, para 7; 
Case C- 328/ 05 SGL Carbon v Commission [2007] ECR I- 3921, para 71. In Joined Cases C- 402/ 05 P and C- 415/ 
05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission (‘Kadi I’) [2008] ECR I- 6351, paras 338– 352, the Court 
held that overriding considerations of safety or the conduct of international relations might justify that certain 
matters may not be communicated to the persons concerned, but do not allow for evidence used against them 
to justify restrictive measures or for them not to be afforded the right to be informed of such evidence within 
a reasonable period after those measures were taken.
121 Case C- 3/ 00 Denmark v Commission [2003] ECR I- 2643.
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Reasoning of decisions
The obligation to give reasons for decisions which is also restated in Article 41(2)(c) 
Charter, in other words to provide grounds for the action taken, finds expression in the 
more general obligation under Article 296(2) TFEU to support all legal acts in the EU with 
reasons.122 The extent of the obligation to state reasons under Article 296 TFEU comprises 
an indication of the legal basis of the act, the general situation which led to its adoption, 
and the general objectives which it intended to achieve:123
the statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning fol-
lowed by the community authority which adopted the measure in question in such a way as 
to make the persons concerned aware of the reasons for the measure and thus enable them to 
defend their rights and to enable the court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.124
The lack of reasoning of an act is ground for its annulment.
Damages
The right to good administration in Article 41(3) Charter contains an explicit reference 
to the right to receive compensation for damage under Article 340 TFEU. Article 41 
Charter therefore cannot limit the obligation to pay damages for violations of the prin-
ciples listed in the provisions on good administration only. The right to damages is dis-
cussed in greater detail in  chapter 10 on judicial review.
Language rights
The entitlement to ‘write’ to the institutions of the Union in one of the languages of the 
Treaties and to receive an answer in the same language simply repeats the existing right 
under Article 24(4) TFEU. Note, though, that Article 342 TFEU gives the Council the 
authority to establish the language regime for the institutions.125 The right of free choice 
of the language is applicable to communication with ‘institutions’ of the EU. Agencies and 
other bodies may thus be subject to specific language regimes.126
122 In the laws of the Member States it can be observed that the duty to give reasons is limited to administra-
tive acts of individual application. In France, the loi of 11 July 1979 provides that in certain cases, which were 
extended by the loi of 17 January 1986, the administration has to give reasons for individual decisions; see A 
de Laubadère, J- C Venezia, and G Yves, Traité de Droit Administratif (14th edn, Paris: LGDJ, 1996) Book 1, 
para 944; this statutory duty does, therefore, not apply to acts of general application, for which only in excep-
tional circumstances has a reasoning to be provided (ibid). See also J Schwarze, European Administrative Law 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1992) 1386. Similarly, in Germany, § 39 of the Federal Law on Administrative 
Procedure (BVwVfG) only applies to administrative acts of individual application; see FO Kopp and U 
Ramsauer, Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (7th edn, Munich:  Beck, 2000) § 39. Acts of general application 
adopted by the executive on the basis of a delegation must state their legal basis in accordance with Art 80(1), 
third sentence, of the Basic Law. This amounts, however, only to a limited form of reasoning; see Schwarze, 
European Administrative Law (loc cit), 1387. In English law, a duty to give reasons is recognized as a require-
ment of natural justice for administrative acts only in exceptional circumstances irrespective of whether the 
act is of individual or general application; see P Craig, Administrative Law (4th edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1999) 377.
123 Case 5/ 67 Beus GmbH v Hauptzollamt München [1968] ECR 83, 95 (English Special Edition, 83); see also 
Pfizer Animal Health (n 87) para 510; Case T- 70/ 99 Alpharma v Council [2002] ECR II- 3495, para 394; Case 
C- 304/ 01 Spain v Commission [2004] ECR I- 7655, para 51; Case C- 184/ 02 Spain and Finland v European 
Parliament and Council [2004] ECR I- 7789, para 79; Case C- 342/ 03 Spain v Council [2005] ECR I- 1975, para 55.
124 TU München (n 110) paras 14 and 26.
125 This was done by one of the first legal acts issued by the Council, Regulation 1/ 58 determining the lan-
guages used by the European Economic Community (OJ English Special Edition [1952– 8] 59).
126 See eg Case T- 120/ 99 Kik v OHIM [2001] ECR II- 2235, para 64.
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3.4  Information- related rights: freedom of information and  
data protection
Any person, not only parties not subject to an individual measure, enjoys the general right 
of access to documents under Article 42 Charter and Article 15(3) TFEU.127 Transparency 
of information can be regarded a precondition for both a fair and accountable administra-
tion and a functioning, participatory democracy in which citizens are able to engage in 
an informed debate and to exert influence on public decision- making. However, freedom 
of information, or more narrowly, the right of access to documents, has not always been 
regarded as a fundamental right or even a matter of priority in EU law.
In line with the administrative traditions of many European countries, public non- 
accessibility and secrecy were generally the norm in regard to information held by European 
authorities.128 This approach changed gradually in light of the increasing recognition of 
the individual’s right to information and as a shift in focus in the context of the ‘Nordic’ 
enlargement of 1995 which gave the Swedish and Finnish traditions in this area a strong 
influence in the EU.129 The right of access to documents is now protected both as a general 
principle of Union law and through provisions of primary law. The right of access to docu-
ments has, over the years, also been an element of several generations of regulation in sec-
ondary law.130 Currently, Regulation 1049/ 2001 issued on the basis of what is now Article 
15 TFEU is the general legislation on access to documents.131 Further reaching rights are 
established in the field of environmental law, which profits from a more open approach 
through the specific implementation of the Aarhus Convention.132 Limitations to the right 
of freedom of information result not least in data protection rights of individuals.133 Most 
recent case law of the Court of Justice has upheld access rights regarding documents arising 
127 Art 15(3) TFEU, lays down that ‘Any citizen of the Union and any natural or legal person residing or hav-
ing its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their medium, subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined 
in accordance with this paragraph.’
128 See eg Case C- 170/ 89 BEUC v Commission [1991] ECR I- 5709, in which the consumer protection NGO 
BEUC was denied access to non- confidential elements of Commission files in an anti- dumping case.
129 See eg the Swedish freedom of the press act, one of Europe’s and most likely the world’s first legislative 
act specifically dedicated to law of information (Konglige Majestäts Nådige Förordning, Angående Skrif- och 
Tryck- friheten of December 2, 1766)  which is still part of the Swedish constitution and Section 12 of the 
Finnish Constitution of 1999 which expressly links freedom of expression and the right of access to informa-
tion: ‘Documents and recordings in the possession of the authorities are public, unless their publication has for 
compelling reasons been specifically restricted by an Act. Everyone has the right of access to public documents 
and recordings.’ (http:// www.finlex.fi). See for an historic analysis of the development of the right to access 
to information, eg D Curtin, ‘Citizens’ Fundamental Right to Access to EU Information: An Evolving Digital 
Passepartout?’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 7 at 7– 11.
130 Initially, the institutions had adopted internal guidelines. Original decisions of the institutions (Council 
Decision 93/ 731 (OJ [1993] L340/ 43); Commission Decision 94/ 90 (OJ [1994] L46/ 58); European Parliament 
Decision 97/ 632 (OJ [1997] L263/ 27)) were based on the right to self- organization.
131 Regulation (EC) No 1049/ 2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ [2001] L145/ 43).
132 Regulation (EC) No 1367/ 2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the 
application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision- 
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (OJ [2006] L264/ 13).
133 See esp Case C- 28/ 08 P Commission v Bavarian Lager [2010] ECR I- 6055 and Joined Cases C- 92/ 09 and 
C- 93/ 09 Schecke [2010] ECR I- 11063, para 85:
It is necessary to bear in mind that the institutions are obliged to balance, before disclosing information 
relating to a natural person, the EU’s interest in guaranteeing the transparency of its actions and the 
infringement of the rights recognised by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. No automatic priority can be 
conferred on the objective of transparency over the right to protection of personal data, even if impor-
tant economic interests are at stake.
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from legislative procedures.134 However exceptions to the constitutionally guaranteed right 
of access to documents listed in Article 4(2) of Regulation 1049/ 2001 have been interpreted 
by the Court of Justice very broadly, now finding that important parts of the administra-
tive activities of the Commission should ‘enjoy a general presumption of confidentiality’.135
Union law governing information contains not only rules on access to information but 
also on the protection of personal information data. Under Article 8 Charter, protection 
of personal information constitutes an individual right against the potential misuse of 
information both by governments and non- governmental actors. Limitations on privacy 
rights to the extent ‘necessary in a democratic society’ are, for example, explicitly recog-
nized in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Legal persons 
are protected with respect to their professional or business secrets. This is recognized, for 
example, in Article 339 TFEU and in secondary legislation.136
3.5  The right to an effective judicial remedy and additional  
rights of defence
The rule of law would be practically meaningless if persons affected by measures of the 
Union or the Member States acting under Union law were not able to object to or chal-
lenge actions affecting their interests.137
3.5.1  Right to an effective remedy
The existence of a right is linked to the existence of a remedy under the principle known 
as ubi ius ibi remedium, which in Union terms might read: where there is a right under 
Union law, there is a remedy to ensure its enforcement. Accordingly, the ‘right to obtain an 
effective remedy in a competent court’ is protected as a fundamental general principle of 
EU law,138 and is also enshrined in Article 47 Charter and Articles 6 and 13 ECHR.
Article 47, first paragraph, Charter, largely following the language of the Convention, 
grants a ‘right to an effective remedy before a tribunal’, where rights and freedoms under 
Union law are violated. Since judicial protection of rights under EU law must be in first 
line offered by courts and tribunals of the Member States, certain provisions refer to the 
notion of courts such as Article 47, second paragraph, Charter clarifying that a tribunal be 
‘independent and impartial’,139 that hearings be ‘fair and public’, and that everyone ‘ha[s] 
the possibility of being advised, defended and represented’.
134 E.g. Case C- 39/ 05 P and 52/ 05 P Sweden and Turco v Council [2008] ECR I- 4723 (Grand Chamber) paras 35– 41.
135 Case C- 612/ 13 P Client Earth EU:C:2015:486. See especially paragraph 77 of the judgment with many 
further references.
136 See eg Art 16 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/ 2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of 
proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (OJ [2004] L123/ 18); Art 28 of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/ 2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ [2003] L1/ 1); Art 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1073/ 1999 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European 
Anti- Fraud Office (OLAF) (OJ [1999] L136/ 1); Art 8(1) of Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/ 96 of 
11 November 1996 concerning on- the- spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order 
to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ [1996] L292/ 2) 
of Regulation 1/ 2003 on antitrust enforcement. Art 28 of Regulation 1/ 2003 protects professional secrecy 
insofar as it provides that this information may only be used for purposes for which it was gathered by the 
Commission and within the competition network and that such information shall not be disclosed.
137 HCH Hofmann, GC Rowe, and A Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 204.
138 Case 85/ 76 Hoffmann- La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461, para 9; Case 222/ 84 Johnston [1986] 
ECR 1651, para 19.
139 Case C- 506/ 04 Wilson [2006] ECR I- 8613, paras 60– 62.
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A remedy under EU law, by analogy with Article 13 ECHR, ‘must be “effective” both in 
law and in practice.’140 Any act which fails to provide ‘for any possibility for an individual 
to pursue legal remedies’ in order to protect her or his rights can be found to violate ‘the 
essence of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 
47 of the Charter.’141 The right to an effective judicial remedy under EU law is also linked 
with the principle of effectiveness (flowing from Article 4(3) TEU as discussed previ-
ously). Under the Factortame formula, the right to an effective remedy offers protection 
against ‘any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or 
judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness’ of Union law.142 That means that 
Member States:
● may ‘not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights’143 
conferred by EU law,
● are obliged to ‘guarantee real and effective judicial protection’,144
● are barred from applying any rule or applying any procedure which ‘might prevent, even 
temporarily, Community rules from having full force and effect’.145
For a practical illustration of this, we turn to Factortame. The right to an effective judicial rem-
edy resulted there in the obligation of the English High Court to offer interim relief measures 
to protect the plaintiff ’s interests under EU law, even though such measures were not available 
to that court under English law at the time.
Compliance with the right to an effective remedy, therefore, depends both on:
● the procedural aspect— whether the Member State offers procedural rules granting 
fair possibilities of bringing a case and that admissibility criteria allow actual access to 
a court,
● and the more substantive issue— whether success on the grounds of the claim of viola-
tion of a right under EU law would lead to a remedy which is capable of addressing the 
violation of the right.146
3.5.2  Additional rights of defence
A guarantee of the respect for ‘the rights of the defence of anyone who has been charged’ is 
provided in Article 48 Charter. But more broadly, under EU law the rights of defence must 
140 Kudla v Poland (Appl No 30210/ 96) ECHR 2000- XI (Grand Chamber) para 157. Art 13 ECHR is, how-
ever, more limited than the right to effective judicial review under EU law. Art 13 ECHR protects only rights 
arising from the Convention— therefore only fundamental rights and freedoms. The general principle of EU 
law, by contrast, protects all rights arising from EU law in both a vertical and a horizontal level. For further 
explanation, see section 3.5.1.
141 Case C- 362/ 14 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner EU:C:2015:650, para 95.
142 Case C- 213/ 89 Factortame [1990] ECR I- 2433, paras 19 and 20.
143 See eg Case C- 128/ 93 Fisscher [1994] ECR I- 4583, para 37; Case C- 261/ 95 Palmisani [1997] ECR I- 4025, 
para 27; Courage (n 3) para 29; Case C- 78/ 98 Preston [2000] ECR I- 3201, para 39; Case C- 187/ 00 Kutz- Bauer 
[2003] ECR I- 2741, para 57; Case C- 30/ 02 Recheio- Cash & Carry [2004] ECR I- 6051, paras 17 and 18; Case 
C- 212/ 04 Adeneler [2006] ECR I- 6057, para 95; Joined Cases C- 231– 233/ 06 Jonkman [2007] ECR I- 5149, para 
28 (emphasis added).
144 Case 14/ 83 Van Colson [1984] ECR 1891, para 23.
145 Factortame (n 142) paras 19 and 20.
146 Correctly, the European Court of Human Rights has pointed out that with respect to Art 13 ECHR (in 
MSS v Belgium and Greece (Appl No 30696/ 09) [2011] ECHR 108 (Grand Chamber) paras 289 and 290) that 
‘the “effectiveness” of a “remedy” within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the certainty of a favour-
able outcome for the applicant.’ Also, even if a single remedy does not by itself entirely satisfy the requirements 
of Art 13, the aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may do so.
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be ensured not only in procedures before a court, but also in administrative procedures con-
ducted by EU institutions and bodies or by Member State bodies implementing EU law. They 
are enforced even ‘where there is no specific legislation and also where legislation exists which 
does not itself take account of that principle’.147 The Court of Justice held that
respect for the rights of the defence constitutes a fundamental principle and must therefore be 
ensured not only in administrative procedures which may lead to the imposition of penalties 
but also during preliminary inquiry procedures such as investigations.148
Some of the rights of the defence in administrative proceedings, such as the right to be 
heard and the right to access to one’s file, have been enshrined in Article 41(2) Charter and 
were discussed previously. Generally speaking, rights of defence include:
● a limited right of legal professional privilege,149 concerning the right to confidential-
ity of communications with an external lawyer;150
● a limited right against self- incrimination151— this, for example, prohibits the 
Commission, in a request for information in competition proceedings, to require the 
undertaking ‘to provide it with answers which might involve an admission on its part 
of the existence of an infringement’.152
Case study 8.4: Terrorism and rights
Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on targets in the US, the United Nations 
introduced what it called ‘smart sanctions’. The UN Security Council was authorized to 
establish lists of persons and entities which were accused by UN Security Council members 
of being in some way or another associated with terrorist organizations such as al- Qaeda. 
UN Member States were then required to freeze personal funds and economic resources 
including access to bank accounts and other assets of these listed persons and entities.
The EU, not a member of the UN but acting within its competencies, implemented these 
decisions of the UN Security Council by various legal acts. As a result, Mr Yusuf and Mr 
Kadi, Swedish citizens, woke up one morning to find that they could no longer withdraw 
money from their bank accounts. They brought cases before the General Court against the 
EU legal acts listing them amongst the persons and entities whose assets should be frozen.153 
The Kadi case was decided by the Court of Justice on appeal. Sanctions against Mr Yusuf were 
withdrawn after several years, apparently because he was struck from the list due to an error 
in transcription of his name from Arabic to other languages.
147 Case 222/ 84 Johnston v Chief Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651. See also Case C- 32/ 95 P Commission v 
Lisrestal [1996] ECR I- 5373, para 30.
148 Hoechst (n 58) summary point 1.
149 See Case 155/ 79 AM&S [1982] ECR 1575, paras 23– 26; Case T- 30/ 89 Hilti v Commission [1990] ECR 
II- 163, para 18; Joined Cases T- 125/ 03 and T- 253/ 03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals [2007] ECR 
II- 3523, paras 117 and 123, and Case C- 550/ 07 P Akzo [2010] ECR I- 8301.
150 Hilti (n 149).
151 See Hoechst (n 58); Case 374/ 87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283. See also Case 27/ 88 Solvay v 
Commission [1989] ECR 3355; Case T- 34/ 93 Société Générale v Commission [1995] ECR II- 545, paras 72– 74; 
Case C- 407/ 04 P Dalmine v Commission [2007] ECR I- 829, para 34.
152 Case C- 407/ 04 P Dalmine v Commission [2007] ECR I- 829, para 35. The Court made it clear in Case C- 60/ 92 Otto v 
Postbank [1993] ECR I- 5683, paras 15– 17, that this limitation does not apply to civil proceedings in national courts.
153 Yusuf and Al Barakaat (n 117); Case T- 315/ 01 Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II- 3649.
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Some of the central legal questions arising in these cases were, aside from the jurisdiction 
of EU Courts and the degree of review of EU legal acts implementing UN Security Council 
decisions (on which, see  chapter 9, case study 9.1), whether the rights of defence and the 
right to an effective judicial review were violated by the EU legal acts. The Court of Justice 
in the Kadi I and Kadi II cases, dismissed the notion of Union acts as capable of having 
some form of ‘immunity’ from judicial review.154 It then went on also to address the issues 
of rights of defence and the right to an effective judicial review.
The General Court in Yusuf had already recalled that the right to a fair hearing required 
an individual to be able to ‘learn about the accusations held against them, to be able to 
understand the evidence gathered against them and to be able to defend themselves 
against such accusations.’155 The right to a fair hearing must be observed ‘in all proceedings 
initiated against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that 
person’.156 Although ‘the right to be heard cannot be extended to the context of a Community 
legislative process culminating in the enactment of legislation’ applying generally, the right 
exists even if a legislative act also targets individuals.157 However, according to the General 
Court, this standard under EU law was not applicable to the case. Rather, the impugned 
EU legal act implementing a UN Security Council decision was only to be reviewed against 
compliance with standards of jus cogens arising from public international law.
On appeal in Kadi I, the Court of Justice set aside the General Court’s decision and held that ‘the 
rights of the defence, in particular the right to be heard, and the right to effective judicial review 
of those rights, were patently not respected’ when the EU simply implemented the UN Security 
Council resolution without following a procedure allowing for compliance with fundamental 
rights.158 Therefore, it annulled the regulation freezing Mr Kadi’s assets. The Court held
that the courts of the european union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, 
of the lawfulness of all european union acts in the light of fundamental rights, including 
where such acts are designed to implement security council resolutions, and that the 
general court’s reasoning was consequently vitiated by an error of law.159
The ‘effectiveness of judicial review means that the competent European Union authority 
is bound to communicate the grounds for the contested listing decision to the person 
concerned and to provide that person with the opportunity to be heard in that regard.’ The 
Court stated that, ‘as regards a decision that a person’s name should be listed for the first 
time, for reasons connected with the effectiveness of the restrictive measures at issue and 
with the objective of the regulation concerned, it was necessary that that disclosure and that 
hearing should occur not prior to the adoption of that decision but when that decision was 
adopted or as swiftly as possible thereafter.’160 ‘Since Mr Kadi had not been in a position 
effectively to make known his point of view in that regard, with the consequence that the 
rights of defence and the right to effective judicial review had been infringed.’161
The Kadi II case, decided by the Court of Justice in 2013,162 arose from the UN Security 
Council’s Sanctions Committee’s attempts to remedy the situation by transferring a summary 
154 Kadi I (n 120), esp paras 325– 327. 155 Kadi I (n 120) paras 325– 327.
156 Yusuf and Al Barakaat (n 117), para 325. 157 Ibid, para 327.
158 Kadi I (n 120) followed the AG. It upheld the Community standards of fundamental rights protection 
in paras 281 et seq.
159 Kadi I (n 120), esp paras 326 and 327.
160 Kadi I (n 120), esp paras 336– 342 in the summary given by Joined Cases C- 584/ 10 P, C- 593/ 10 P, and 
C- 595/ 10 P Commission and UK v Kadi, EU:C:2013:518 (Grand Chamber), para 24.
161 Kadi I (n 120) paras 345– 349 in the summary given by Commission and UK v Kadi (n 160) para 25.
162 Commission and UK v Kadi (n 160).
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narrative of reasons for the listing of Mr Kadi (referred to as Mr Qadi) to him and publishing it 
on the UN website. Mr Kadi sent his statements to the Commission, requested the production of 
the evidence in support of the claims and assertions made in the UN’s summary of reasons, and 
asked that he be allowed to submit comments on that evidence. Irrespective of these demands, 
the Commission adopted a new regulation continuing the freezing of Mr Kadi’s assets without 
further commenting on the statements made by Mr Kadi in response to the allegations of the UN.
Again, Mr Kadi brought an action for annulment against this act before the General 
Court alleging, inter alia, breach of the right of the defence and of the right to effective 
judicial protection. The Court, in view of Kadi I, had found that it was to ensure ‘in principle 
the full review’ of the lawfulness of the contested regulation in light of the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the EU. This meant that
the courts of the european union must review the assessment made by the institution 
concerned of the facts and circumstances relied on in support of the restrictive measures 
at issue and determine whether the information and evidence on which that assessment 
is based is accurate, reliable and consistent.163
The Court found that there was a breach of Mr Kadi’s rights of defence because
those rights had been respected only in a purely formal and superficial sense, since the 
commission considered itself strictly bound by the findings of the sanctions committee 
and at no time envisaged calling them into question in the light of mr Kadi’s comments or 
making any real effort to refute the exculpatory evidence adduced by mr Kadi.
(a) No access to the evidence against him
mr Kadi was refused access by the commission to the evidence against him despite his 
express request, whilst no balance was struck between his interests and the need to pro-
tect the confidentiality of the information in question.
(b) Vague and insufficient allegations
the few pieces of information and the vague allegations in the summary of reasons relat-
ing to the listing of mr Kadi . . . for example, that mr Kadi was a shareholder in a bosnian 
bank in which planning sessions for an attack on a united states facility in saudi arabia 
‘may have’ taken place, were clearly insufficient to enable mr Kadi to mount an effective 
[defence against allegations].164
The General Court also found ‘that the principle of effective judicial protection had been 
infringed’ on the grounds that neither was Mr Kadi afforded proper access to the information 
and evidence used against him,’ nor had he been able to ‘defend his rights with regard to that 
information and evidence in satisfactory conditions.’ Further, no evidence of that kind or any 
indication of the evidence relied on against Mr Kadi had been disclosed to the Court.165
On appeal, the Court of Justice in its Kadi II judgment confirmed the General Court’s 
interpretation of the violation of the right of defence and of an effective judicial review.166 
The right of defence arises from both the general principles of EU law affirmed, inter 
alia, by Articles 42(2) and 47 Charter. However, limitations on the exercise of the right 
are possible, as set out in Article 52(1) Charter. This requires that limitations respect the 
163 Commission and UK v Kadi (n 160) paras 39– 41.
164 Case T- 85/ 09 Kadi v Commission (‘Kadi II’) [2010] ECR II- 5177 (General Court) paras 171– 180 as cited 
by Commission and UK v Kadi (n 160) para 43.
165 Kadi II (n 164) paras 181– 184 as cited by Commission and UK v Kadi (n 160) para 44.
166 Commission and UK v Kadi (n 160) paras 97– 134.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Apr 11 2017, NEWGEN
he-9780198789130-ch6-10.indd   224 4/11/2017   3:41:10 PM
 criteria fOr legality 225
 
essence of the right in question and are proportionate. It also requires analysis of the specific 
circumstances of the particular case, including the nature of the act at issue, the context of 
its adoption, and the legal rules governing the matter in question.167
One of the obligations which arises in the context of the right to good administration 
and is also related to the right of defence is the obligation of the Union administration 
regarding the ‘duty of care’. In the words of the Court of Justice, when ‘comments are made 
by the individual concerned on the summary of reasons, the competent European Union 
authority is under an obligation to examine, carefully and impartially, whether the alleged 
reasons are well founded, in the light of those comments and any exculpatory evidence 
provided with those comments.’168
The duty to state reasons for a decision arising from Article 296 TFEU and the right 
to an effective judicial review ‘entails in all circumstances’, ‘that that statement of reasons 
identifies the individual, specific and concrete reasons why the competent authorities 
consider that the individual concerned must be subject to restrictive measures.’169 The 
reason for this is that effective judicial review requires verification of the allegations and 
a review of whether ‘those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed 
sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated’.170 In the absence of sufficient 
reasoning of the act, the Courts will base their review ‘solely on the material which has 
been disclosed to them’ and if ‘that material is insufficient to allow a finding that a reason is 
well founded, the Courts of the European Union shall disregard that reason’.171 The reason 
behind this is that ‘the essence of effective judicial protection must be that it should enable 
the person concerned to obtain . . . annulment’ of the contested measure.172
The Court of Justice therefore concluded that
[it] follows from the criteria analysed above that, for the rights of the defence and the 
right to effective judicial protection to be respected first, the competent european union 
authority must (i) disclose to the person concerned the summary of reasons provided 
by the sanctions committee which is the basis for listing or maintaining the listing of 
that person’s name in annex i to regulation no 881/ 2002, (ii) enable him effectively to 
make known his observations on that subject and (iii) examine, carefully and impartially, 
whether the reasons alleged are well founded, in the light of the observations presented 
by that person and any exculpatory evidence that may be produced by him.173
The Kadi and Al Barakaat cases, as well as the Ahmed Ali Yusuf case, have become central 
reference points for several central issues of EU law. They address not only the relation 
between EU law and public international law obligations of the Member States in general, 
but they also clarify that it is inconceivable that any exercise of public authority by the EU 
could fail to comply with fundamental rights and EU general principles protecting both 
substantive and procedural rights of individuals. Procedural rights, especially regarding the 
rights of defence and of good administration including the right to a fair hearing, the right 
to access to one’s file, and many other rule of law- related principles, were enforced by the 
Court of Justice in a highly publicized case.
167 Ibid, para 102.
168 Ibid, para 114 with references to Case C- 269/ 90 Technische Universität München [1991] ECR I- 5469, 
para 14; Case C- 525/ 04 P Spain v Lenzing [2007] ECR I- 9947, para 58.
169 Commission and UK v Kadi (n 160) para 116 with references to Joined Cases C- 539/ 10 P and C- 550/ 10 P 
Al- Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al- Aqsa ECLI:EU:C:2012:711, paras 140 and 142, and Case C- 417/ 11 P 
Council v Bamba, ECLI:EU:C:2012:718, paras 49– 53.
170 Commission and UK v Kadi (n 160), para 119.   171 Ibid, para 123.
172 Ibid, para 134.   173 Ibid, para 135.
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4  Conclusion
In summary, with entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union under the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 6(1) TEU) many of the rights and principles 
which were initially established under the case law of the Court of Justice only, are now also 
restated in positive law. This adds to the prominence of principles which might initially not 
have been known to the wider public, such as the right to good administration in Article 
41 Charter. Importantly, however, this has not led to the discarding of the ‘old’ approach of 
case law- led developments of rights as general principles. To the contrary, under Article 6(3) 
TEU, rights are also protected as general principles of EU law. There is no hierarchy between 
the different sources of Article 6(1) TEU versus Article 6(3) TEU. This contributes to the 
dynamism of the EU legal system, which continues to be capable of adapting to new chal-
lenges arising from policy areas increasingly becoming subject to ‘Europeanization’ and new 
influences, such as the drive towards more transparency of the legal system which took on 
board some of the more ‘Nordic’ legal traditions of the EU. One of the topics which was not 
addressed in this chapter but which is arising as a big challenge to EU administrative law is 
the possibility and, arguably, the need for a general administrative procedure act for the EU. 
This might clarify to a much greater degree than Article 41 Charter was capable of doing, 
the rights of individuals and obligations of administrations implementing EU law. Especially 
in the context of a highly integrated system of implementation of EU law in which Member 
State and EU institutions and bodies are involved, such clarification of applicable procedural 
provisions would add much to the transparency of the system, compliance with principles 
under the rule of law, and good administration in general.
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